

Liberalismo relazionale, dominio epistemico e tirannia della maggioranza

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Relational Liberalism, Epistemic Domination, and the Tyranny of the Many

Abstract: In *Relational Liberalism*, Federica Liveriero argues that, to realise the ideal of democracy as co-authorship, citizens should treat one another as putative epistemic authorities over political matters. For this to be possible, on her view citizens should display *intellectual modesty* regarding their epistemic abilities, and a constructive posture when confronting others. In this paper, I argue that, for this thesis to be successful, much more attention should be devoted to the power structures that engender *epistemic domination* – i.e., the disempowerment of some through the denial of credibility and intelligibility –, and hamper the attainment of epistemic symmetry among citizens. I then focus on Liveriero's defence of strong judicial review as a means to counter majoritarian will. I argue that, even if it might effectively shield citizens from the tyranny of the many, it is not fully compatible with the ideal of democracy as co-authorship that Liveriero defends. I conclude by highlighting that this raises a dilemma for Liveriero's relational liberalism.

Keywords: Democratic citizenship, Intellectual modesty, Epistemic domination, Tyranny of the majority, Judicial review.

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